Immigration-safer pleas
There is no list of pleas that are safe for a noncitizen, and this page is not one. What exists is a set of questions, one for each category of charge, whose answers decide which grounds of removal a plea triggers and which forms of relief it closes. Asked before the plea, most of them can still be answered differently. This page goes through the categories and says what to ask the prosecutor for instead, and why.
Current as of October 2026. We re-check this page regularly and after any rule change.
Every request on this page is an ordinary request. Prosecutors agree to a different count, a lower sentence, a particular factual basis or a diversion every day, for reasons that have nothing to do with immigration. What a noncitizen's lawyer brings to the table is knowing which request matters for this client, and the reason behind it. That reason comes from the analysis on the plea strategy page, and the requests below are organized the way the grounds of removal are.
Why we will not hand you a list of statutes
You will find websites that say "plead to section such-and-such and you will be fine." We do not, for three reasons. First, whether an offense is a crime involving moral turpitude, an aggravated felony or a crime of violence is decided under the categorical approach, described on the categorical approach page: the elements of the statute are compared to a federal definition, and the least serious conduct the statute punishes controls. That comparison is made statute by statute, subsection by subsection, and the courts of appeals do not always agree. A list that is right in one circuit is wrong in another. Second, statutes change, and a list written last year can be wrong this year. Third, the consequence depends on the reader's status. A plea that does nothing to a permanent resident can be a controlled-substance admission that ends an adjustment application, because the inadmissibility list has no marijuana exception and reaches admissions without a conviction. A list cannot know who is reading it.
What we give you instead is the question each category turns on, and the request that answers it. Whether a specific statute answers it is the work of reading the statute against the definition, and we do that with your charge in front of us.
Theft, assault and domestic violence
Theft
Two grounds are in play. A theft offense with a term of imprisonment of at least one year is an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(G), and under 101(a)(48)(B) a suspended sentence counts in full. Theft is also a crime involving moral turpitude when it requires an intent to deprive the owner permanently, or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded; under Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. 847 (BIA 2016), a statute that reaches purely temporary takings is broader than that definition. Ask for a sentence of 364 days or less, which keeps the plea below the (G) threshold. Ask whether the offense of conviction, as it will appear in the record, requires intent to permanently deprive; where it does not, the CIMT question is open. And where the client has only one CIMT, ask for a sentence of six months or less on an offense whose maximum does not exceed one year, which is the petty offense exception in INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
Assault and domestic violence
A crime of violence with a one-year sentence is an aggravated felony under 101(a)(43)(F). A crime of violence against a spouse, former spouse, co-parent, cohabitant or a person protected by the jurisdiction's domestic-violence laws is a crime of domestic violence under 237(a)(2)(E)(i), with no sentence threshold at all. Both start with 18 U.S.C. 16(a): an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force. Under Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), and Matter of Velasquez, 25 I&N Dec. 278 (BIA 2010), that means violent force, force capable of causing pain or injury, and offensive touching is not enough. Under Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), negligent conduct is not the use of force. Whether reckless conduct qualifies is governed, on identical language, by Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), and how the Board and the circuits apply Borden to 16(a) is a question we describe only as open.
The request follows. Ask for an offense that does not have violent force as an element. Ask for a record that is silent on the relationship between you and the complainant: under Matter of H. Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 2016), the domestic relationship is proved from reliable evidence under the circumstance-specific approach, not from the elements, so what the plea colloquy and the charging document say about the complainant matters. Ask that no court make a finding that you violated the protective portion of a protection order, because under 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) and Matter of Obshatko, 27 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2017), that finding is a ground of deportability without any conviction. And ask for 364 days on anything that could be a crime of violence. The Board has held that an assault requiring intent to cause physical injury, and causing it, is a CIMT, while simple assault without an aggravating element generally is not, under Matter of Solon, 24 I&N Dec. 239 (BIA 2007). The domestic violence page has the detail.
Drugs, fraud and firearms
Drugs
A conviction under any law relating to a controlled substance as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802 is a ground of deportability under 237(a)(2)(B)(i) and of inadmissibility under 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The substance has to be on the federal schedules. Under Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015), a state conviction that does not tie the offense to a federally controlled substance does not support the charge, so where the state statute is broader than the federal schedules, ask for a plea whose record does not name a federally controlled substance. The exception, for a single offense of possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana for personal use, exists on the deportability list and in the 212(h) waiver but not on the inadmissibility list, so it helps a permanent resident far more than an applicant. In federal court, a first offender found guilty of simple possession can be placed on probation without a judgment under 18 U.S.C. 3607, and a dismissal under that statute is not a conviction; a state look-alike does not get the same treatment. Distribution is a separate problem: it is a CIMT under Matter of Khourn, 21 I&N Dec. 1041 (BIA 1997), and it is an illicit-trafficking aggravated felony if it would be a federal felony under Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006), though under Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), a statute whose minimum conduct is sharing a small amount of marijuana for nothing is not an illicit-trafficking aggravated felony. Possession rather than distribution, where the facts allow it, is the request. The drug offenses page goes further.
Fraud
Crimes with fraud as an ingredient are CIMTs under Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), and a fraud or deceit offense becomes an aggravated felony under 101(a)(43)(M)(i) when the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000, a statutory loss threshold. Under Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), that loss is decided from the record and must be tied to the count of conviction. So the request is a plea to a count whose loss is below the threshold, and a restitution order that matches the count rather than the whole scheme. A stipulation or sentencing finding that puts the loss above the line on the count of conviction will be used. The fraud and theft page covers the tax variants.
Firearms
A conviction for buying, selling, owning, possessing or carrying a firearm as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921(a) is a ground of deportability under 237(a)(2)(C), with no sentence threshold, and it triggers mandatory detention under 236(c)(1)(B). The federal definition excludes antique firearms, so a state statute that reaches antiques is broader than the federal one, and that argument is litigated. The request is an offense whose elements do not require a firearm under 921(a): a weapon offense that is not a firearm offense. There is no parallel firearms ground on the inadmissibility list, so this ground matters most to people who have been admitted. The firearms page explains the rest.
The sentence and the disposition
The sentence requests repeat across categories, so here they are in one place. Each is a line in the statute, and each counts suspended time in full.
| Ask for | Because | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| 364 days or less | Theft, burglary, crime of violence, forgery, counterfeiting, commercial bribery, obstruction and perjury become aggravated felonies at a term of imprisonment of at least one year | INA 101(a)(43)(F), (G), (R), (S); 101(a)(48)(B) |
| Six months or less, on an offense with a maximum of one year | A single CIMT falls within the petty offense exception to inadmissibility | INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) |
| Under 180 days of confinement | Confinement of 180 days or more as a result of a conviction is a bar to good moral character during the statutory period | INA 101(f)(7); 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(2) |
| Aggregate sentences under five years | Multiple convictions with aggregate sentences to confinement of five years or more are a separate ground of inadmissibility, regardless of moral turpitude | INA 212(a)(2)(B) |
The 364-day page explains how each of the four jurisdictions structures the request.
The disposition
Before the sentence, ask what you will have to say in court. Under INA 101(a)(48)(A), a plea of guilty or no contest, or an admission of sufficient facts, followed by any penalty or restraint, is a conviction even where the court withholds judgment. A dismissal after a program with no plea and no finding of guilt is not. Where a no-plea diversion is available, it is the request that makes the rest of this page unnecessary, and the deferred adjudication page explains how to ask for it. Where the client was young enough, a New York youthful offender adjudication is not a conviction under Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000); the youthful offender page covers the limits of that rule and why we do not extend it to other states without checking.
The attempt and conspiracy caveat
A plea to attempt is not a way around the list. INA 101(a)(43)(U) makes an attempt or conspiracy to commit any aggravated felony an aggravated felony, and it follows the underlying entry, thresholds included. The CIMT inadmissibility ground in 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) reaches an attempt or conspiracy to commit a CIMT, and the controlled-substance grounds reach conspiracy and attempt as well. An attempt plea changes the analysis only where the underlying offense is outside the ground, or where it lowers the sentence below a threshold. Ask what the attempt is an attempt to do before you ask for it.
Read next: the 364-day sentence, deferred and withheld adjudication, the record of conviction, or your right to advice before a plea.
Common questions
Why does this page not just list the statutes to plead to?
Because whether a statute is a ground of removal is decided under the categorical approach, by comparing its elements to a federal definition, and the answer changes with the statute, the subsection, the circuit and sometimes the year. A list that is right for one reader is wrong for the next. It also changes with your status: a plea that does nothing to a permanent resident can end the case of a person applying for a green card. We describe what makes a category safer and what to ask for. We do not offer any statute number as a safe harbor.
Is a plea to attempt safer than a plea to the completed offense?
Not by itself. INA 101(a)(43)(U) makes an attempt or conspiracy to commit any aggravated felony an aggravated felony, the CIMT inadmissibility ground reaches attempts and conspiracies, and the controlled-substance grounds reach conspiracy and attempt as well. An attempt plea helps only where the underlying offense is outside the ground, or where it changes the sentence exposure. Ask what the attempt is an attempt to do.
Does a shorter sentence always help?
It helps with the grounds that turn on the sentence: the one-year aggravated felony entries, the six-month petty offense exception, the 180-day good moral character bar, the five-year aggregate lines. It does nothing for the grounds that turn on the offense alone, such as a controlled-substance conviction, a firearms conviction or a crime of domestic violence. Match the request to the ground you are trying to avoid.
My status is not permanent. Does the same advice apply?
The categories are the same but the consequences are not. A person seeking admission or adjustment is judged under the inadmissibility grounds, which have no marijuana exception, reach admissions without a conviction, and require a waiver for any CIMT. A permanent resident is judged under the deportability grounds, which have a five-year rule for a single CIMT and a small-marijuana exception. The your-status pages explain which list is yours.
Tell us about the charge before you take the plea. Not after.
You get a free conversation with an immigration attorney, in your language. We speak English, Russian, Spanish and Uzbek in-house, and we bring in a live interpreter for anything else. We will read the charge against the immigration statute, tell you what the offered plea does to your status and to every form of relief, and tell you what to ask your criminal lawyer to negotiate instead. If the plea has already been entered, we will tell you what can still be done.