Crimes involving moral turpitude
A crime involving moral turpitude is an offense whose elements require reprehensible conduct and a guilty state of mind. Fraud, theft with intent to permanently deprive, and intentional assault causing injury usually qualify. A simple DUI, simple possession and an offensive-touching assault usually do not. One such conviction within five years of admission, or two at any time, makes an admitted person deportable, and one alone can make a person inadmissible unless the petty offense exception applies. It is the most common criminal ground in plea negotiations, and the most negotiable.
Current as of October 2026. We re-check this page regularly and after any rule change.
Two questions decide whether a plea is a crime involving moral turpitude, and a third decides what it does. Do the elements of the offense require reprehensible conduct? Do they require a guilty state of mind? And, if the answer to both is yes, which ground of removal or bar to relief does that conviction land on for a person in your status? The term is not defined in the statute. It is defined by Board and court decisions applied one offense at a time, so the answer comes from the elements of the statute, not from the name of the crime. This page covers the definition, the two deportability grounds, the inadmissibility ground and its exceptions, the categories that usually qualify and usually do not, and what the label closes. The map of every criminal ground is on the crimes and removal page.
The definition
In Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2016), the Board restated the test. A crime involving moral turpitude requires reprehensible conduct committed with some form of scienter. Both halves are required. Conduct that is reprehensible but punishable on a strict-liability or negligence basis is not enough. A guilty mind attached to conduct that is merely regulatory is not enough either.
Whether an offense meets that test is decided under the categorical approach. The judge looks at the elements of the statute of conviction and asks whether the least serious conduct it punishes involves moral turpitude. The facts of what you actually did are not the question. The same 2016 decision withdrew the Board's earlier "realistic probability" and record-based inquiry from its 2008 decision of the same name, so the analysis is now the elements, and where the statute is divisible, the record of conviction. The categorical approach page explains how that comparison works and what "divisible" means.
A plea to an offense whose elements can be met without a guilty mind is not a crime involving moral turpitude no matter what happened. The wording of the count matters more than the facts in the police report.
The two deportability grounds
For a person who was admitted, INA 237(a)(2)(A) has two moral-turpitude grounds, and they work differently.
One conviction: the five-year rule
Under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), a person is deportable who is convicted of one crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of admission (ten years for certain admissions under INA 245(j)), where a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. Three things have to be true. The offense is a crime involving moral turpitude. It was committed, not convicted, inside the five years. And the statutory maximum for it is a year or more. The sentence you actually received does not matter for this ground; the maximum does.
Which admission starts the clock? Under Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011), the five years run from the admission by virtue of which the person was present in the United States when the crime was committed. An adjustment of status can be that admission. Bring the whole immigration history to the plea conversation, not just the date of the green card.
A 364-day maximum and the "may be imposed" test
The one-conviction ground asks whether a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. On the text of the statute, an offense whose maximum is 364 days cannot meet that test. New York's class A misdemeanor carries a maximum of 364 days under Penal Law 70.15 as amended in 2019, so the argument is available for a class A misdemeanor plea committed within five years of admission. That is our reading of the text, not a case holding, so talk to us before relying on it; the New York page says the same. The 364-day page covers the sentencing structures in New York, New Jersey, Florida and federal court.
Two convictions: at any time
Under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), a person is deportable who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of the sentence. No five-year window. No sentence threshold. A second plea to a minor offense years after the first one completes it.
"Single scheme" is narrow. Under Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992), the Board's own test is that when an act is itself a complete, individual and distinct crime, a second such act is a second crime even if it closely follows, is similar, or is part of an overall plan; a single scheme is limited to cases such as a lesser included offense or two crimes that flow from a single act. In the Second and Third Circuits, which cover New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the Board applies the broader circuit test: one continuous episode with a single criminal objective. Separate crimes committed on separate occasions are not a single scheme. Two shoplifting pleas six months apart are two convictions.
INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii); Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011); Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992). The government must prove deportability by clear and convincing evidence, INA 240(c)(3)(A).
The inadmissibility ground and its two exceptions
For a person seeking admission, adjusting status, or returning from travel as a permanent resident, the test is INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I): conviction of, or admission of the essential elements of, a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit one. One conviction is enough. There is no five-year window and no sentence threshold. And unlike the deportability ground, this one reaches an admission without a conviction, which is why what you say in a plea colloquy, an allocution or an interview can matter even where the disposition is not a conviction.
Two exceptions are written into INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), and both apply only to this ground.
- The petty offense exception. The ground does not apply to a person who committed only one crime involving moral turpitude, where the maximum penalty possible did not exceed one year and, if convicted, the sentence imposed did not exceed six months, regardless of any suspension. A six-month sentence suspended in full is a six-month sentence, which fits; a nine-month sentence suspended in full does not. The petty offense exception page goes through every part of this.
- The juvenile exception. The ground does not apply where the crime was committed when the person was under 18 and more than five years before the date of application for a visa or admission. INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
Neither exception appears in INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i). An admitted person charged with deportability for one crime involving moral turpitude within five years cannot answer that charge with the petty offense exception. The exception can still matter to that person for relief, which is covered below.
The burden runs the other way on this list. An applicant for admission must show clearly and beyond doubt that they are admissible, INA 240(c)(2), and under Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224 (2021), an applicant for relief with an inconclusive record loses on that point. The deportability versus inadmissibility page explains which list applies to you.
Categories that usually qualify, and categories that usually do not
The table gives the categories settled by published precedent. Every entry is a category, not a statute number. Whether a particular state statute matches the category has to be checked under the categorical approach, and a statute that punishes more conduct than the category describes may fall outside it.
| Category | Usually | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Fraud, or any crime with fraud as an ingredient | A CIMT | Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) |
| Theft with intent to permanently deprive, or where the owner's rights are substantially eroded | A CIMT. A statute that reaches purely temporary takings is broader than the generic definition | Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. 847 (BIA 2016) |
| Distribution of a controlled substance | A CIMT | Matter of Khourn, 21 I&N Dec. 1041 (BIA 1997) |
| Assault with intent to cause physical injury, and causing it (the New York third-degree assault at issue in Solon) | A CIMT | Matter of Solon, 24 I&N Dec. 239 (BIA 2007) |
| Aggravated DUI: driving under the influence while knowing the license is suspended or revoked | A CIMT | Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I&N Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999) |
| Simple DUI, including several of them | Not a CIMT | Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2001) (en banc) |
| Simple possession of a controlled substance | Generally not a CIMT; the authority is split (it is a controlled-substance ground instead) | Matter of Khourn, 21 I&N Dec. 1041, 1046 n.5 (BIA 1997) (reserving the question); Matter of Abreu-Semino, 12 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1968), as described there |
| Simple assault without an aggravating element | Generally not a CIMT | Matter of Solon |
Then there are the categories where the answer depends on the statute. Weapons possession, resisting arrest, criminal trespass, harassment and reckless endangerment each turn on the exact elements of the statute and on which circuit's law governs. A rule for one statute would be wrong for the next, so we read yours with you, and the plea tool marks these categories "depends" rather than guessing.
What a crime involving moral turpitude closes
| Consequence | Effect | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Cancellation for non-permanent residents | Barred by any conviction of an offense under 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2). The petty offense exception applies to a CIMT that would otherwise be a 212(a)(2) offense, but not to one that is independently a 237(a)(2) ground | INA 240A(b)(1)(C); Matter of Cortez Canales, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010) |
| Cancellation for permanent residents | Not barred by the label alone; only an aggravated felony bars it. But the offense stops the seven-year clock at commission if it renders you inadmissible under 212(a)(2) | INA 240A(a), 240A(d)(1); Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222 (2020); Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999) |
| Good moral character | Conditional bar during the statutory period, subject to the petty offense exception | INA 101(f)(3); 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(2) |
| Adjustment of status | Requires admissibility; a 212(h) waiver is needed if the ground applies | INA 245(a)(2); INA 212(h) |
| The 212(h) waiver | Available for the CIMT ground, with its own bars and the violent-or-dangerous standard | INA 212(h)(1); 8 C.F.R. 1212.7(d); Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002) |
| Mandatory detention | Triggered for a person inadmissible under 212(a)(2); for two CIMTs; and for one CIMT with a sentence of at least one year | INA 236(c)(1)(A), (B), (C) |
| Returning permanent residents | A resident who has committed an offense identified in 212(a)(2) is treated as seeking admission on return, unless the conviction predates April 1, 1997 | INA 101(a)(13)(C)(v); Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012) |
This label rarely ends a case by itself, and almost always changes what has to be filed and how long it takes. A crime involving moral turpitude that also carries a sentence of a year or more, or a loss over the fraud threshold, may be an aggravated felony as well, and that label closes far more. The aggravated felony page has that list.
What this means at the plea
Four things to ask for, in roughly this order.
A count without the intent element
A count whose elements do not require intent to defraud, to permanently deprive, or to injure.
A maximum under a year
A count with a maximum sentence under a year, for the five-year deportability ground.
Six months or less, on a one-year maximum
A sentence of six months or less, on a count with a maximum of a year or less, for the petty offense exception.
Not a second crime involving moral turpitude
Where there is already one conviction on the record, anything that is not a second crime involving moral turpitude, because the second one has no window and no threshold.
The plea strategy pages go through how each is negotiated, and the immigration-safer pleas page covers the categories that are usually safer.
Read next: the petty offense exception, fraud and theft offenses, aggravated felonies, or the categorical approach.
Common questions
Is there a list of crimes involving moral turpitude?
No. The statute does not define the term, and the Board of Immigration Appeals decides it offense by offense under the categorical approach. Under Matter of Silva-Trevino (2016), the question is whether the least serious conduct the statute punishes involves reprehensible conduct committed with some form of scienter. Some categories are settled by precedent, such as fraud under Jordan v. De George and theft with intent to permanently deprive under Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga. Many others depend on the wording of the particular statute and the circuit, so ask us about your charge rather than rely on a list.
I have one conviction. Am I deportable?
It depends on when the crime was committed and what sentence the statute allowed. Under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), one crime involving moral turpitude makes an admitted person deportable only if it was committed within five years after the admission and a sentence of one year or longer could have been imposed. Under Matter of Alyazji, the five years run from the admission by virtue of which you were in the country when the crime was committed, which can be an adjustment of status. A crime committed after the five years, or one with a maximum sentence under a year, does not fit this ground, though it may still matter for inadmissibility and relief.
Does the petty offense exception help me?
It helps with inadmissibility, not with the deportability ground. Under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), a single crime involving moral turpitude does not make you inadmissible if the maximum possible penalty was one year or less and the sentence imposed was six months or less. A suspended sentence counts in full. The exception does not appear in INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), so an admitted person charged with deportability for one such crime within five years cannot use it against that charge.
Can a crime involving moral turpitude be waived?
Often, yes. The 212(h) waiver reaches inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), the moral turpitude ground, on a showing of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative, or after fifteen years with rehabilitation. It has its own bars, including one for certain permanent residents with an aggravated felony or less than seven years of residence, and a heightened standard for violent or dangerous crimes. Whether a waiver is realistic is a separate question from whether the offense is a ground, and both have to be asked before the plea.
Tell us about the charge before you take the plea. Not after.
You get a free conversation with an immigration attorney, in your language. We speak English, Russian, Spanish and Uzbek in-house, and we bring in a live interpreter for anything else. We will read the charge against the immigration statute, tell you what the offered plea does to your status and to every form of relief, and tell you what to ask your criminal lawyer to negotiate instead. If the plea has already been entered, we will tell you what can still be done.