Fraud and theft offenses
Theft and fraud are the two categories where the sentence and the loss amount matter as much as the crime. A theft offense with a sentence of one year is an aggravated felony; the same offense with 364 days is not. A fraud offense with a loss over $10,000, a statutory threshold, is an aggravated felony; the same scheme pleaded to a count with a smaller loss is not. And both are usually crimes involving moral turpitude no matter the sentence, which is where the petty offense exception comes in.
Current as of October 2026. We re-check this page regularly and after any rule change.
Three numbers decide most theft and fraud pleas. The sentence: one year makes a theft offense an aggravated felony, 364 days does not. The loss: over $10,000, a statutory threshold, makes a fraud offense an aggravated felony. And the maximum: a one-year maximum with a six-month sentence, on a single offense, can take a crime involving moral turpitude out of the inadmissibility ground. Every one of those numbers is negotiable, and the count and the record set all three. This page takes the aggravated felony entries, the moral turpitude analysis, the petty offense exception, detention, and the stop-time rule. The map of every criminal ground is on the crimes and removal page.
The aggravated felony entries
Five entries on the list in INA 101(a)(43) cover theft, fraud and their relatives. Two turn on the sentence. Three turn on a dollar amount. One entry, money laundering, turns on the amount of funds rather than a loss.
| Entry | Offense | Threshold |
|---|---|---|
| (G) | A theft offense, including receipt of stolen property, or a burglary offense | Term of imprisonment of at least one year |
| (M)(i) | An offense involving fraud or deceit | Loss to the victim or victims exceeding $10,000, a statutory threshold, not a fee or a penalty |
| (M)(ii) | Tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. 7201 | Revenue loss to the government exceeding $10,000, the same statutory threshold |
| (D) | Money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956 or 1957 | Amount of funds exceeding $10,000, a statutory threshold |
| (R) | Commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles with altered identification numbers | Term of imprisonment of at least one year |
Attempts and conspiracies to commit any of them are covered by entry (U). The aggravated felony page has the full list and the table of everything the label closes: cancellation for permanent residents, asylum, the 212(h) waiver for a person who entered as a resident, and good moral character permanently, among others.
The sentence entries
"Term of imprisonment" in entries (G) and (R) means the sentence the court ordered, including any suspended portion. INA 101(a)(48)(B). A one-year sentence suspended in full, with no day served, is a one-year sentence. A theft offense with a one-year sentence is an aggravated felony whether what was taken was worth a hundred dollars or a hundred thousand. The value of the property is not on the entry. The sentence is.
364 days is not one year
Entries (G) and (R) say "at least one year," which means 365 days. A sentence of 364 days, served or suspended, is below it. New York's class A misdemeanor carries a maximum of 364 days for this reason. In a state where the misdemeanor maximum is a full year, the difference is a single day in the plea agreement. The 364-day page covers how that day is negotiated in New York, New Jersey, Florida and federal court.
The loss entries
In Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), the Supreme Court held that the $10,000 loss in (M)(i), a statutory threshold, is not an element of the offense to be analyzed categorically. It is decided under a circumstance-specific approach, from the record of the case, and it must be tied to the count of conviction. Loss on dismissed counts, or from the broader scheme described in an indictment, is not supposed to be attributed to the count you pleaded to. But a plea agreement that stipulates to a larger loss, a restitution order that exceeds the threshold, or a sentencing finding that does, will be read as evidence of the loss on the count of conviction. The record is where the number lives.
Under Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012), tax offenses under 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) and (2), which are not evasion, can be (M)(i) offenses involving fraud or deceit. So a tax plea reaches the list by two routes: evasion under (M)(ii), and any other tax offense with fraud or deceit as an ingredient under (M)(i), each with the same threshold.
INA 101(a)(43)(D), (G), (M), (R), (U); INA 101(a)(48)(B); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009); Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012).
Theft and fraud as crimes involving moral turpitude
Independently of the sentence and the loss, theft and fraud are the two categories most reliably held to involve moral turpitude, which puts them on the one-CIMT and two-CIMT deportability grounds and on the inadmissibility ground.
- Fraud. Under Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), crimes with fraud as an ingredient are crimes involving moral turpitude. Any offense whose elements require an intent to defraud or deceive is in the category: false statements, forgery with intent to defraud, identity theft, bad checks with intent to defraud, and the like. A statute that punishes a false statement without an intent to deceive is a different question.
- Theft. Under Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. 847 (BIA 2016), theft is a crime involving moral turpitude when it requires an intent to deprive the owner permanently, or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded. A statute that reaches purely temporary takings, such as an unauthorized use or joyriding statute, is broader than the generic definition. Whether a particular theft statute requires permanent deprivation, or is divisible on that point, has to be checked under the categorical approach.
What that means in practice: a theft plea with a short sentence and no aggravated felony problem is still a crime involving moral turpitude, still counts toward two, and still makes an applicant for admission or adjustment inadmissible unless the petty offense exception applies. The moral turpitude page has the grounds and the five-year rule.
The petty offense exception for a single small theft
Under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), the inadmissibility ground for a crime involving moral turpitude does not apply to a person who committed only one such crime, where the maximum penalty possible did not exceed one year and, if convicted, the sentence imposed did not exceed six months, regardless of any suspension. A single misdemeanor shoplifting plea, on a count with a one-year maximum and a sentence of six months or less, fits. A second one does not. A felony count does not. A nine-month suspended sentence does not.
The exception applies to the inadmissibility ground, and through it to adjustment of status, to the returning-resident rule, and to good moral character, where the regulation applies it to the CIMT bar. It does not appear in the deportability ground for one CIMT in INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i). The petty offense exception page covers each of those interactions.
The safer theft disposition, for a person with no prior CIMT, is a single misdemeanor count with a maximum of one year or less and a sentence of six months or less, on a statute that does not require intent to permanently deprive if one is available. Each of those is a separate ask.
Detention: the Laken Riley Act and the theft arrest
Mandatory detention under INA 236(c)(1) already reached a person inadmissible under 212(a)(2), a person deportable for two CIMTs or an aggravated felony, and a person deportable for one CIMT with a sentence of at least one year. The Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1 (January 29, 2025), added a ground that does not wait for a conviction. A person who is inadmissible under INA 212(a)(6)(A), (6)(C) or (7), and who is charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or admits committing theft, burglary, larceny, shoplifting, assault of a law enforcement officer, or a crime resulting in death or serious bodily injury, is subject to mandatory detention on that basis.
The consequence for a person without lawful status is that a shoplifting arrest, before any plea, can mean detention without a bond hearing. The plea negotiation for that person happens from custody, and the outcome of the criminal case does not undo the arrest that triggered it. The mandatory detention page and the no lawful status page cover this, and our detention practice at icebail.com handles bond.
Stop-time
Under INA 240A(d)(1), the continuous residence or physical presence needed for cancellation of removal ends when the person commits an offense referred to in 212(a)(2) that renders them inadmissible under 212(a)(2) or removable under 237(a)(2), or when a notice to appear is served, whichever is earlier. Under Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999), time stops at commission, not conviction. Under Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222 (2020), an offense that would render a permanent resident inadmissible stops time even though the resident is not seeking admission. A theft or fraud CIMT is an offense referred to in 212(a)(2), so the date of the offense, not the date of the plea, is the date the clock stops for a person who has not yet reached seven or ten years. The stop-time page covers the rule.
One more ground with no conviction: INA 212(a)(2)(I) makes inadmissible a person the government has reason to believe has engaged in money laundering. That ground needs no plea, and a laundering count dismissed as part of a deal does not remove the facts from the file.
What this means at the plea
The negotiating points for theft and fraud are unusually concrete, because they are numbers.
- 364 days, not a year. On any theft, receipt, burglary, forgery or counterfeiting count, a sentence of 364 days or less, suspended or served, keeps the conviction off entries (G) and (R). That is the single day described above.
- A loss under the threshold, with restitution that matches. On a fraud, deceit or tax count, a plea to a count whose loss is at or under $10,000, the statutory threshold, with a restitution order and a factual basis that match that figure, keeps the conviction off entry (M). A stipulation or a restitution order that exceeds it, on the count of conviction, does the opposite under Nijhawan.
- A count without intent to permanently deprive. Where the state has an offense of unauthorized use or temporary taking, a plea to it may fall outside the Diaz-Lizarraga definition of theft as a crime involving moral turpitude. Whether it also falls outside the (G) theft entry is a separate categorical question.
- One count, one year maximum, six months or less. For a person with no prior CIMT, a single count that fits the petty offense exception keeps the inadmissibility ground from applying.
None of these removes the risk from a theft or fraud plea. A theft conviction with a short sentence is still a crime involving moral turpitude, still a second CIMT if there was a first, still a stop-time event, and for a person without status still a Laken Riley Act detention predicate from the day of arrest. The plea strategy pages cover how the numbers are negotiated, and the record of conviction page covers which documents the loss will be read from.
Read next: the 364-day sentence, the petty offense exception, aggravated felonies, or crimes involving moral turpitude.
Common questions
Is shoplifting a deportable offense?
It can be, in two ways. Theft with intent to permanently deprive is a crime involving moral turpitude under Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, so a shoplifting conviction counts toward the one-CIMT and two-CIMT deportability grounds and the inadmissibility ground, subject to the petty offense exception for a single offense with a one-year maximum and a sentence of six months or less. And if the sentence imposed is one year or more, including any suspended portion, a theft offense is an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(G) regardless of the value of what was taken.
How is the $10,000 loss measured?
From the record of the case, not from the elements of the statute. Under Nijhawan v. Holder, the loss under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i) is decided under a circumstance-specific approach, and it must be tied to the specific count of conviction. A plea agreement, a stipulation, a restitution order or a sentencing finding that puts the loss above the threshold will be used. Loss from dismissed counts or uncharged conduct is not supposed to count against the count you pleaded to, which is why the loss figure in the plea documents is negotiated.
Does a tax plea count as fraud?
It can. INA 101(a)(43)(M)(ii) covers tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. 7201 with a revenue loss over $10,000, a statutory threshold. Under Kawashima v. Holder, other tax offenses, including filing a false return under 26 U.S.C. 7206, can be (M)(i) offenses involving fraud or deceit with the same threshold. So a tax plea reaches the aggravated felony list by two routes, and the loss amount in the record decides both.
I have not been convicted of anything. Can I still be detained for a theft arrest?
Under the Laken Riley Act, yes, for certain people. The Act added mandatory detention for a person who is inadmissible under INA 212(a)(6)(A), (6)(C) or (7) and who is charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or admits committing theft, burglary, larceny, shoplifting, assault of a law enforcement officer, or a crime resulting in death or serious bodily injury. The arrest alone is enough for a person on that inadmissibility predicate.
Tell us about the charge before you take the plea. Not after.
You get a free conversation with an immigration attorney, in your language. We speak English, Russian, Spanish and Uzbek in-house, and we bring in a live interpreter for anything else. We will read the charge against the immigration statute, tell you what the offered plea does to your status and to every form of relief, and tell you what to ask your criminal lawyer to negotiate instead. If the plea has already been entered, we will tell you what can still be done.