The stop-time rule
Cancellation of removal requires seven years of continuous residence for a permanent resident and ten years of continuous physical presence for anyone else. Under INA 240A(d)(1), that time stops on the day you commit an offense referred to in 212(a)(2) that makes you inadmissible or removable, or the day a Notice to Appear is served, whichever comes first. It stops at commission, not at conviction. A plea entered years later cannot move the date, but it can change whether the offense is one that stops the clock at all.
Current as of October 2026. We re-check this page regularly and after any rule change.
Most of the rules on this site turn on what the conviction is. This one turns on when the offense happened. It decides whether you will have the years you need for cancellation of removal on the day you ask for it, and it is the one consequence of a plea that no negotiation over the sentence can touch, because the date of the offense is already written. What can still be negotiated is the category. This page explains the rule, works through the dates, and says what that means at the plea. The grounds it refers to are on the crimes and removal page.
The rule
INA 240A(d)(1) says that any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence ends on the earliest of two events:
- service of a Notice to Appear under INA 239(a); or
- the date you commit an offense referred to in INA 212(a)(2) that renders you inadmissible under 212(a)(2) or removable under 237(a)(2) or (a)(4).
Two decisions fix how the second event works. Under Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999), the clock stops at commission, not at conviction. Under Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222 (2020), an offense that "renders" a permanent resident inadmissible under 212(a)(2) stops time even though the resident is not seeking admission and could not be charged under the inadmissibility grounds at all.
The offense has to be one "referred to in" 212(a)(2). That list is the inadmissibility list explained on the deportability versus inadmissibility page: crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled-substance violations, multiple convictions with five years of aggregate sentences, prostitution, and the reason-to-believe grounds. Whether a given offense is on that list is decided under the categorical approach. Grounds that appear only on the deportability list, such as firearms, raise a separate question about whether they are "referred to in" 212(a)(2), and that is a question to put to us.
What an incomplete notice does
The first event is service of a Notice to Appear under INA 239(a). What a notice that omits required information does to the clock has been litigated separately, and it is a question for the removal defense side of the case rather than for the plea. This page is about the second event, the one the criminal case controls.
The two clocks
| Form of relief | Time required | Measured from | Other requirements | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cancellation for permanent residents | 7 years of continuous residence | Any admission, in any status | Permanent resident for at least 5 years; no aggravated felony conviction | INA 240A(a) |
| Cancellation for non-permanent residents | 10 years of continuous physical presence | Arrival, with or without admission | Good moral character for the period; no conviction under 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(3); exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a citizen or resident spouse, parent or child | INA 240A(b)(1) |
The stop-time rule ends both. For the permanent resident, the seven years run from the first admission in any status, which is why a student or work visa admission years before the green card can count. For the non-permanent resident, a conviction under 212(a)(2) is also a flat bar under 240A(b)(1)(C), so for that person the rule matters most where the offense was committed and the case ended without a conviction, or where the plea has not yet been entered and the category is still open.
Worked examples
The dates are invented. The arithmetic is the point.
A permanent resident, one offense, seven years
You were admitted on a student visa on August 15, 2018. You adjusted to permanent residence on May 3, 2022. Your continuous residence runs from August 15, 2018, the first admission in any status, so seven years would be complete on August 15, 2025. On March 10, 2024 you commit a theft offense that is a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore an offense referred to in 212(a)(2). You plead guilty on January 20, 2026. A Notice to Appear is served on September 1, 2026.
Your residence stopped on March 10, 2024, the commission date, at five years and seven months. The plea date and the notice date are both later and do not matter. You are short of seven years and cancellation under 240A(a) is unavailable, whatever the sentence was. Had the same offense been committed on September 10, 2025, the seven years would already have been complete, and the rule would not take them back.
The same resident, an offense that is not a ground of deportability
Change one fact. The theft is committed on March 10, 2024, more than five years after the August 2018 admission, and the sentence is nine months. A single CIMT committed more than five years after admission is not a ground of deportability under 237(a)(2)(A)(i), and DHS cannot charge you with it. It still renders you inadmissible under 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because the petty offense exception requires a sentence of six months or less. Under Barton, that is enough. The clock stops on March 10, 2024 even though you are not seeking admission and are not deportable for the offense. If DHS later charges you on some other ground, the seven years are not there.
A person with no lawful status, ten years
You entered without inspection on June 1, 2015. Ten years of physical presence would be complete on June 1, 2025. On November 4, 2024 you are arrested for a shoplifting offense, and in March 2025 you plead to it. If the offense is a crime involving moral turpitude and falls outside the petty offense exception, it is a 212(a)(2) offense that renders you inadmissible, and your presence stopped on November 4, 2024 at nine years and five months. The conviction also bars non-LPR cancellation outright under 240A(b)(1)(C). If instead the offense is not a CIMT, or the case ends in a disposition that is not a conviction and no admission of the elements was made, the ten years run through June 1, 2025 and continue until a Notice to Appear is served.
An offense that does not stop the clock
Same person, same dates, but the arrest on November 4, 2024 is for a simple DUI with no aggravating element. Under Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2001), a simple DUI is not a crime involving moral turpitude, so it is not an offense referred to in 212(a)(2) and does not stop time. The clock runs until the Notice to Appear. The DUI can still matter for good moral character, which is covered on the good moral character page.
What this means at the plea
The date is fixed. The category is not.
Nothing in a plea agreement changes when the offense happened. A shorter sentence, a later sentencing date, a deferred disposition: none of them moves the commission date, because the rule does not look at the disposition date at all. What the plea does decide is whether the offense of conviction is one referred to in 212(a)(2). A plea to an offense whose elements do not make it a crime involving moral turpitude or a controlled-substance violation, tested under the categorical approach, is a plea to an offense that does not stop the clock. That is the negotiating point.
Three practical consequences follow.
Count the years before the plea, from the offense date
If the seven or ten years were complete on the day of the offense, the stop-time rule is not the problem; the flat bars are. If they were not, the category of the plea decides whether cancellation survives.
The petty offense exception is a stop-time exception too
A single CIMT that fits within 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) does not render you inadmissible under 212(a)(2). On the text of the statute that removes the inadmissibility route to stopping time; whether the deportability route still applies depends on the sentence that may be imposed and the five-year rule. A sentence of six months or less on a one-year-maximum offense is worth asking for on this ground alone. The petty offense page has the rest.
Admissions count
The inadmissibility list reaches a person who admits the essential elements of a CIMT or a drug offense. A factual basis in a case that ends without a conviction is still an admission on the record. The record of conviction page explains what the immigration judge will read.
The category-by-category negotiating points are on the plea strategy pages. What cancellation itself requires and how it is litigated is on our removal defense site, immigrationtrial.com.
Cancellation of removal for permanent residents: the three requirements, the stop-time rule in court, and the discretionary case.
Cancellation for permanent residents →
immigrationtrial.comCancellation of removal for non-permanent residents: ten years, good moral character, the criminal bars and the hardship standard.
Cancellation for non-permanent residents →
Common questions
Does the clock stop when I plead guilty or when I committed the offense?
When you committed it. Under Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999), an offense referred to in INA 212(a)(2) stops the accrual of continuous residence or physical presence on the date of commission, not the date of conviction. A plea entered two years after the offense stops time as of the offense date. The conviction is what establishes that the offense was one that stops time; the date comes from the offense itself.
I am a green card holder and I am not traveling. Can an offense that only makes me inadmissible still stop my clock?
Yes. Under Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222 (2020), an offense that renders a permanent resident inadmissible under 212(a)(2) stops time even though the resident is not seeking admission and is not being charged under the inadmissibility grounds. A single crime involving moral turpitude committed more than five years after admission, which is not a ground of deportability, can still end the seven years.
Does every conviction stop the clock?
No. The offense has to be one referred to in INA 212(a)(2) that renders you inadmissible under 212(a)(2) or removable under 237(a)(2) or (a)(4). A simple DUI, which under Matter of Torres-Varela is not a crime involving moral turpitude, is not a 212(a)(2) offense and does not stop time on its own. Whether a particular offense qualifies is decided under the categorical approach, so ask us about your statute rather than rely on a list.
If my clock already ran, does the offense still matter?
The stop-time rule only matters if the time had not yet accrued when the offense was committed. If the seven or ten years were complete before the offense date, the rule does not take them away. The conviction can still bar cancellation on other grounds: an aggravated felony bars cancellation for permanent residents under INA 240A(a)(3), and any conviction under 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(3) bars cancellation for non-permanent residents under INA 240A(b)(1)(C).
Tell us about the charge before you take the plea. Not after.
You get a free conversation with an immigration attorney, in your language. We speak English, Russian, Spanish and Uzbek in-house, and we bring in a live interpreter for anything else. We will read the charge against the immigration statute, tell you what the offered plea does to your status and to every form of relief, and tell you what to ask your criminal lawyer to negotiate instead. If the plea has already been entered, we will tell you what can still be done.