Federal offenses
A federal plea is analyzed under the same immigration rules as a state plea, with one difference: many entries on the aggravated felony list point to a federal statute by number, so a plea to that statute matches the entry without any categorical argument about a state analog. Immigration crimes, fraud with a loss over the statutory threshold, tax offenses, firearms counts and money laundering are the federal pleas that reach the list most often. This page goes through them, the federal first-offender statute that keeps a simple possession from being a conviction, and the way a federal plea agreement becomes the record the immigration judge reads.
Current as of October 2026. We re-check this page regularly and after any rule change.
Federal court changes the vocabulary and not the rules. The grounds on the crimes and removal page apply to a federal conviction exactly as they apply to a state one; what differs is that the federal statutes are the ones the aggravated felony list names, and that the plea agreement, the stipulated facts and the presentence findings are unusually complete. A federal plea is a well-documented plea, and the documentation is what the immigration judge reads.
Offense classes and the first-offender statute
Federal offenses are classified by their maximum term under 18 U.S.C. 3559(a). A felony is an offense punishable by more than one year. A class A misdemeanor is punishable by one year or less but more than six months. The immigration statute does not use those labels, but the maximum matters in two places: the single-CIMT deportability ground in INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i) asks whether a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, and the petty offense exception asks whether the maximum exceeded one year. A class A misdemeanor with a one-year maximum satisfies the first and does not fail the second.
Simple possession under 21 U.S.C. 844(a) is a misdemeanor for a first offense, with a maximum of one year, and a felony where the person has a prior drug conviction. That structure is why two Supreme Court decisions come up in every drug plea. Under Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006), a state drug offense is an illicit-trafficking aggravated felony only if it would be punishable as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act, so state-felony simple possession is not. Under Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), a second possession conviction is not an aggravated felony unless the recidivist enhancement was actually charged and proved in the criminal case.
18 U.S.C. 3607: the one federal disposition that is not a conviction
A person found guilty of simple possession under 844 who has no prior drug conviction may be placed on probation without entry of judgment. On successful completion the proceeding is dismissed "without entering a judgment of conviction," and the statute says the dismissed proceeding "shall not be considered a conviction for the purpose of a disqualification or a disability imposed by law upon conviction of a crime." That language is what takes the disposition outside INA 101(a)(48)(A). It is available once, in federal court, for simple possession. A state statute modeled on it does not carry the federal language, and under Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1999), a state rehabilitative dismissal leaves the conviction in place.
Immigration crimes
| Offense | Classification | Immigration consequence | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Improper entry, INA 275(a) | Misdemeanor; up to 6 months for a first offense | Not among the criminal grounds we cover. An aggravated felony under (O) only where the person was previously deported on the basis of an aggravated felony conviction | INA 275(a); INA 101(a)(43)(O) |
| Reentry after removal, INA 276 | Felony | An aggravated felony under (O) only if the prior removal was for an aggravated felony | INA 276(a); INA 101(a)(43)(O) |
| Fraud and misuse of visas, permits and other documents, 18 U.S.C. 1546 | Federal felony | A ground of deportability under 237(a)(3)(B)(iii). An aggravated felony under (P) where the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except a first offense committed to assist only a spouse, child or parent | 18 U.S.C. 1546; INA 237(a)(3)(B)(iii); INA 101(a)(43)(P) |
| Alien smuggling, INA 274(a)(1)(A) or (2) | Federal felony | An aggravated felony under (N), except a first offense where the person smuggled only a spouse, child or parent. Smuggling is also a conditional bar to good moral character | INA 101(a)(43)(N); INA 101(f) |
| False claim to United States citizenship | Conduct ground, with or without a conviction | Inadmissible under 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), with no 212(h) waiver; deportable under 237(a)(3)(D) | INA 212(a)(6)(C)(ii); INA 237(a)(3)(D) |
Entry (O) is the one people misread. The reentry statute is a felony, and a reentry conviction can carry a long sentence, but it is an aggravated felony only when the removal it followed was itself based on an aggravated felony. The certified record of the earlier removal is the document that answers that question, and it has to be read before anyone concedes the label.
Fraud, tax and money laundering
Three entries on the aggravated felony list turn on a dollar amount, and all three are common federal pleas. In each, the figure is a statutory threshold written into the definition, not a fee, a bond or a penalty.
- (M)(i), fraud or deceit. An offense involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000. Wire fraud, mail fraud, bank fraud, false statements and conspiracy counts are analyzed here. Under Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), the loss is not an element and is not decided categorically; it is found from the record of the case and must be tied to the count of conviction. Fraud is also a crime involving moral turpitude under Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), whatever the loss.
- (M)(ii), tax evasion. Evasion under 26 U.S.C. 7201 with a revenue loss exceeding $10,000. Under Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012), other tax offenses, including filing a false return under 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) and assisting in one under 7206(2), can be (M)(i) offenses involving fraud or deceit. A plea to a non-evasion tax count does not, on its own, keep the case off the list.
- (D), money laundering. An offense under 18 U.S.C. 1956 or 1957 where the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000. Separately, INA 212(a)(2)(I) makes a person the government has reason to believe engaged in money laundering inadmissible, without a conviction.
The plea agreement is the record
In a federal case the loss is usually stipulated in the plea agreement, found in the presentence report, adopted at sentencing and written into the restitution order. Each of those is the "record of the case" Nijhawan allows the immigration judge to read. A stipulation to a loss figure for guidelines purposes that covers relevant conduct beyond the count of conviction is the trap: the immigration question is the loss tied to the count you pleaded to, and the agreement should say what that loss is. A plea to a count whose loss is at or below the threshold, with a restitution order that matches, is the defense. The fraud and theft page has the detail.
Firearms and drug trafficking counts
Entry (B) reaches illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and it borrows the definition of a "drug trafficking crime" from 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2): any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act. That is a definition, not a reference to a 924(c) firearms conviction; a federal drug felony is within entry (B) whether or not a firearm was involved. One federal firearms statute is named on the list directly. Felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), together with the other 922(g) categories the entry lists, is within entry (E). Neither requires a one-year sentence and neither depends on a state analog; the plea is to the statute the entry names. Any federal firearms conviction is also a ground of deportability under INA 237(a)(2)(C), which has no inadmissibility counterpart and no waiver, as the firearms page explains.
Federal drug distribution and conspiracy counts under the Controlled Substances Act are illicit trafficking within entry (B), and distribution is a crime involving moral turpitude under Matter of Khourn, 21 I&N Dec. 1041 (BIA 1997). The categorical questions that dominate state drug pleas, whether the substance is on the federal schedules under Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015), and whether the state offense would be a federal felony under Lopez, largely fall away when the statute of conviction is the federal one.
Undoing a federal plea
A person in federal custody challenges the conviction by motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, subject to the one-year limit in 2255(f). A person no longer in custody, which describes most people by the time the immigration case begins, petitions for a writ of coram nobis under United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954). The ground most often available to a noncitizen is the one in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010): counsel's failure to advise of the immigration consequences of the plea. Under Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), that rule does not reach a conviction that became final before March 31, 2010, and under Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017), prejudice can be shown where deportation was the determinative issue and the defendant would have gone to trial even with little chance of acquittal.
A federal vacatur counts for immigration purposes on the same terms as a state one: under Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), it must rest on a substantive or procedural defect in the original case, not on immigration hardship. The vacating a plea page and the after a plea section cover what the motion has to say and how it fits with the immigration case.
Before the plea, the federal negotiating points are the same five as everywhere else and one more: the count, the sentence, the disposition, the record, the timing, and in federal court the stipulated loss. The plea strategy pages go through them.
Read next: fraud and theft offenses, aggravated felonies, drug offenses, or vacating a plea.
Common questions
Is illegal reentry an aggravated felony?
Only in one situation. Under INA 101(a)(43)(O), illegal entry or reentry under INA 275(a) or 276 is an aggravated felony when the person was previously deported on the basis of an aggravated felony conviction. A reentry conviction after a removal that was not for an aggravated felony is a felony under INA 276 but is not on the list under (O). Improper entry under INA 275(a) is a misdemeanor for a first offense.
I pleaded to a federal fraud count and the plea agreement says the loss was over $10,000. Does that make it an aggravated felony?
Very likely, if the loss is tied to the count you pleaded to. Under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), an offense involving fraud or deceit with a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000, a statutory loss threshold, is an aggravated felony, and under Nijhawan v. Holder the loss is decided from the record of the case rather than from the elements. A stipulated loss in a plea agreement, a restitution order or a sentencing finding is that record. Fraud is also a crime involving moral turpitude under Jordan v. De George.
What is the federal first-offender statute?
18 U.S.C. 3607. A person found guilty of simple possession under 21 U.S.C. 844 with no prior drug conviction may be placed on probation without entry of judgment, and on successful completion the case is dismissed without adjudication of guilt. The statute says that disposition shall not be considered a conviction for any disqualification or disability imposed by law. It applies to the federal statute; a state program modeled on it does not get the same protection, because under Matter of Roldan-Santoyo a state rehabilitative dismissal leaves the conviction in place.
How do I challenge a federal plea?
A person still in federal custody moves under 28 U.S.C. 2255, which carries a one-year limit under 2255(f). A person no longer in custody may petition for a writ of coram nobis under United States v. Morgan. The ground most often available to a noncitizen is a plea entered without the immigration advice Padilla v. Kentucky requires, and under Chaidez v. United States that ground is not available for a conviction that became final before March 31, 2010.
Tell us about the charge before you take the plea. Not after.
You get a free conversation with an immigration attorney, in your language. We speak English, Russian, Spanish and Uzbek in-house, and we bring in a live interpreter for anything else. We will read the charge against the immigration statute, tell you what the offered plea does to your status and to every form of relief, and tell you what to ask your criminal lawyer to negotiate instead. If the plea has already been entered, we will tell you what can still be done.